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Multipolarity, Intellectual Property, and the Internationalization of Public
Health Law
SAM F. HALABI*
ABSTRACT
This Article critically examines the proliferation of international legal
agreements addressing global health threats like the outbreak of infectious
diseases, tobacco use and lack of access to affordable medicines. The
conventional wisdom behind this trend is that a global normative shift has
occurred which has caused states to regard health as “special” and less
subject to the normal rules of international law making because health
threats endanger all of humanity. This Article challenges that thesis,
arguing that at the same time the number and scope of international
health law treaties has grown, developed states have subordinated health
law to intellectual property protection for patents and trademarks, both of
which erect substantial barriers to the objectives of public health law
treaties. To the extent international health law has generated meaningful
gains for global population health, it has not done so through a normative
shift in how diplomacy works, but precisely because of politics as usual.
International public health law gains have come largely from the efforts of
an emerging group of middle-income, influential states like Brazil, India,
Indonesia, South Africa and Thailand who have sufficient weight to force
concessions from wealthier states. Using the parallel histories of
international intellectual property treaties and global public health law,
the Article demonstrates that the normative force of health-based
arguments is relatively weak. To the extent public health advocates urge
the adoption of more treaties, as they are now poised to do, they must
more squarely address the threat posed by international intellectual
property protection and make strategic calculations as to the political
feasibility of those agreements given the changing distribution of global
economic and political power.
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INTRODUCTION
The cause of global health today is arguably the most influential
human rights movement ever seen, mobilizing vast flows of direct and
indirect aid to the developing world to fight disease and build health care
infrastructure; prompting the establishment of international organizations
like UNAIDS and the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria (Global Fund); including global health as an agenda priority in
major diplomatic summits; and, driving the formation and implementation
of international agreements to address global health threats. Champions of
this movement claim that the diverse and influential state and non-state
actors participating in the development of the global health regime are
evidence of its normative, law-making power. Speaking of a range of
initiatives undertaken by the World Health Organization, Christopher
McDougall, Ross Upshur and Kumanan Wilson wrote that:
Each . . . also reflects a revolutionary willingness of the international
community to accept new forms of supranational authority and to
abide by the principle that national sovereignty can in some
circumstances be subordinate to public health protection. As such,
they are integral parts of the evolution of international health
governance towards a global public health security regime.1
In 2007, the governments of Brazil, France, Indonesia, Norway,
Senegal, South Africa, and Thailand issued the Oslo Ministerial
Declaration declaring that:
The early 21st century . . . . has seen an unprecedented convergence of
global health and foreign policy . . . . Ensuring public health on a
global scale is of beneﬁt to all countries. Powerful synergies arise
when national interest coincides with the need for concerted regional
and global action.2
Indeed, the evidence for the normative strength of the global health
movement is persuasive. From 1995 to 2010, the value of goods and

1

Christopher McDougall, Ross Upshur and Kumanan Wilson , Emerging Norms for the
Control of Emerging Epidemics, BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/86/8/08-051771/en/
2
Celso Amorim (Brazil); Philippe Douste-Blazy (France); Hasan Wirayuda (Indonesia);
Jonas Gahr Støre (Norway); Cheikh Tidiane Gadio (Senegal); Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma
(South Africa); Nitya Pibulsonggram (Thailand), Oslo Ministerial Declaration—global
health: a pressing foreign policy issue of our time available at
http://www.who.int/trade/events/Oslo_Ministerial_Declaration.pdf.
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services aimed at improving global health increased at least threefold. 3
Global health was introduced as a priority at the 26th G8 Summit – giving
rise to the Global Fund – and has remained on the agenda ever since.4
Since 2005, states have updated the International Health Regulations to
coordinate broader responses to more diseases as well as concluding the
first international public health treaty, the Framework Convention for
Tobacco Control (FCTC).
Yet that evidence is also deceiving. The 2005 International Health
Regulations (IHR), concluded in the wake of outbreaks of diseases largely
in developing countries, appeared to falter on the unwillingness of wealthy
countries to equitably address vaccine production and distribution. Key
provisions of the FCTC have failed in the face of challenges tobacco firms
have mounted on the basis of their rights in trademarks and brands.
Indeed, formal global health instruments which purportedly capture the
health movement’s normative force have been systematically undermined
by a competing global movement: international intellectual property
protection.
Intellectual property rights and public health interventions are in many
ways natural antagonists. The exclusive control given pharmaceutical
patent holders, while theoretically required to encourage investments in
research and development, stands at odds with access to affordable
medicines. The goodwill trademark proprietors build through investments
in advertising and marketing often trades off with costs imposed upon
society through excessive or deceptively-induced consumption. 5 This
3

Josh Michaud, Global Health’s Private-Sector Revolution, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW,
14 Dec. 2010 available at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7328/globalhealths-private-sector-revolution
4
Kurokawa, Kyoshi et al., Italian G8 Summit: A Critical Juncture for Global Health,
373 (9663) THE LANCET 526-527 (14 Feb. 2009).
5
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, REDUCING TOBACCO USE: A REPORT OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL 166 (2000), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics
/sgr/2000/complete_report/pdfs/Chapter5.pdf (describing the various marketing tactics of
tobacco companies that have prompted regulatory action); Joe B. Tye, Kenneth E.
Warner & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Advertising and Consumption: Evidence of a
Causal Relationship, 8 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 492, 494–95 (1987) (emphasizing cigarette
manufacturers’ interest in advertising and promotion to maintain brand); Pinya Silayoi &
Mark Speece, Packaging and Purchase Decisions: An Exploratory Study on the Impact
of Involvement and Time Pressure, 106(8) BRITISH FOOD J. 617 (2004); David A.
Marshall, Mark Stuart, & Rick Bell, Examining the Relationship Between Product
Package Colour and Product Selection in Preschoolers, 17 FOOD QUALITY &
PREFERENCE 615, 615 (2006) (noting the importance of color in food choice); Ike-Elechi
Ogba & Rebecca Johnson, How Packaging Affects the Product Preferences of Children
and the Buyer Behaviour of Their Parents in the Food Industry, 11(1) Young Consumers:
Insight & Ideas for Responsible Marketers, 77, 79-80 (2010); Aron M. Levin & Irwin P.
Levin, Packaging of Healthy and Unhealthy Food Products for Children and Parents:
The Relative Influence of Licensed Characters and Brand Names, 9(5) J. CONSUMER
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antagonism has long played out in the domestic context, where lawmakers
conditioned intellectual property rights on their relationship with other
national health priorities. India, for example, prohibited pharmaceutical
patents for most of its history, a decision driven by the need to facilitate
access to affordable medicine for its massive population.6
While national politics played the major role in deciding the balance
between intellectual property protection and public health priorities,
international agreements governing intellectual property and international
public health issues tended to acknowledge the threat strong IP protections
posed for public health measures. The Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property, for example, allowed states to invalidate or refuse
to register trademarks which misled or deceived consumers and left states
free to grant compulsory licenses for reasons of public health. In any case,
international intellectual property and international public health
instruments alike depended on traditional diplomatic compliance
mechanisms like good faith fulfillment of obligations, consultations in the

BEHAVIOUR 393 (2010); Alice Louw & Michelle Kimber, The Power of Packaging, The
Customer Quality Company, available at
http://www.tnsglobal.com/_assets/files/The_power_of_packaging.pdf; WHO, Diets,
Globalization and Noncommunicable Diseases available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/9241590416.pdf; Gill Cowburn & Lynn Stockley,
Consumer Understanding and Use of Nutrition Labelling: A Systematic Review, 8(1) PUB.
HEALTH NUTRITION, 21, 21-22 (2005); Carolyn L. Engelhard & Arthur Garson, Jr.,
Reducing Obesity: Policy Strategies From the Tobacco Wars (July 2009) available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411926_reducing_obesity.pdf.( Governments in the
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand have found front-of-package, graphic
warnings more effectively communicate nutritional information to consumers than
nutritional information boxes); Michael Skapinker, Europe Must Think Again on Food
Labels, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 29, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3b1e26bc-83af11df-b6d5-00144feabdc0,s01=1.html (“One report from Australia concluded that the
most cost-effective interventions for obesity prevention were a 10% tax on junk food,
restricting unhealthy food advertising to children, and the labeling of food packaging
with an easier-to-understand traffic-light system); Cigarette Packaging – What Rights for
the Trademark Owner?, 22 IP in the Media 1-2 (Sept. – Oct. 2010) (discussing plain
packaging debate on cigarette packaging) available at
http://www.completeip.com.au/attachments/File/Issue___22.pdf.
6
N Nanda and R Lodha, Access to Essential Medicines and Affordable Drugs: Making
Essential Medicines Affordable to the Poor – with Special Reference to India, 20 WISC.
INT’L. L. J. 581 (2002); Vikas Bajaj and Andrew Pollack, India’s Supreme Court to Hear
Dispute on Drug Patents, NY TIMES (Mar. 7, 2012) available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/business/global/indias-supreme-court-to-hear-longsimmering-dispute-on-drug-patents.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
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event of a dispute and tit-for-tat sanctions. 7 In short, they were enforced,
often weakly, at the state-to-state level. 8
In the last 30 years, the global movement to elevate the international
legal status of intellectual property rights has also achieved substantial
gains.
Industrialized states successfully tied intellectual property
protections they desired to the reductions in tariffs and other barriers to
imports of foreign agricultural, clothing and textile goods sought by many
developing countries, formalized in the WTO’s Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). Thousands of bilateral
investment treaties, largely forged between developed states and
developing states, included strong protections for intellectual property
rights that frequently exceeded those in existing international agreements,
even TRIPS, and certainly beyond those typically found in national
legislative frameworks.9
Yet, unlike the earlier era when IP rights and international public
health law were roughly equivalent in their limited influence, the
expansion of international public health law has proceeded with its explicit
and implicit subordination to IP rights. For example, TRIPS provides a
general authorization for parties to “adopt measures necessary to protect
public health” but requires that “such measures are consistent with the
provisions” of TRIPS.10

7

Jennifer Prah Ruger, Normative Foundations of Global Health Law, 96 GEO. L.J. 423,
438-39 (2008) (“Theoretically, the enforcement model of states' behavior argues that
states are rational actors maximizing utility and thus will adhere to or violate treaties
depending on a cost-benefit calculation regarding their actions. Under this model and its
compliance theory, treaty regimes must have costly enforcement mechanisms to compel
compliance.”).
8
Susy Frankel, WTO Application of the “Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public
International Law” to Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT’L. L. 365, 378 (2006) (“GATT
panels did not have any ability to affect intellectual property laws and there was no
effective international enforcement of international intellectual property treaties.”); J.H.
Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the
TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L LAWYER 345, 362 (1995) (“In
retrospect, the weakness of the international regime governing trademark protection
derived only in part from the failure of key developing countries to adhere to the Paris
Convention (or to its later versions), and mainly from the lax enforcement of existing
norms that state practice tolerated.”).
9
Burton Ong, The Trademark Law Provisions of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, in
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 229, 230
(Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008) (“Similarly, trademark law
provisions which have found their way into bilateral free trade agreements are also
intended to fortify and, in most cases, expand the domestic legal framework from which
trademark owners derive their exclusive rights.”).
10
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 8, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
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The confrontation between the growing strength of international
intellectual property law and national public health measures is welldocumented. Even before TRIPS, IP rights holders successfully used
international agreements to thwart domestic public health policies.
Contesting Australia’s 1992 effort to require tobacco manufacturers to sell
cigarettes in plain packaging, British American Tobacco argued before the
Australian Senate that such a law would violate both the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Australian constitution.11
Persuaded by the tobacco industry, the Australian government rejected the
proposed regulations. 12 In 1994, Philip Morris and RJR Reynolds
undertook a similarly successful campaign in Canada based in significant
part on the intellectual property protection provisions of NAFTA. In 1998,
pharmaceutical firms holding the patents to antiretroviral drugs in South
Africa brought suit against the government for its efforts to use parallel
imports and price controls to expand access to treatment for its exploding
HIV/AIDS population.13 Their suit was based in significant part on the
failure of the government’s legislative basis for the measures to comply
with TRIPS. The firms ultimately relented, although with guarantees by
South Africa to respect TRIPS obligations.14
The purpose of this Article is to argue that international intellectual
property law has not only erected substantial barriers to domestic or
national measures taken in the interest of public health, but that
intellectual property protections embedded in a wide range of investment,
trade and IP treaties have substantially undermined existing and proposed
international public health law. From vaccine development orchestrated
by the WHO acting under the authority of the IHR to the marketing of
breastmilk substitutes to pregnant and nursing mothers in developing
countries to efforts by national authorities to implement provisions of the
FCTC, international intellectual property law has systematically curtailed
the intended population health benefits promised by effective
implementation of these agreements.

11. See Generic Packaging, Supplementary Submission to Senate Comm.; Submission to
the Industry Inquiry from W.D. & H.O. Wills (Aust.) Ltd., The Tobacco Growing and
Manufacturing
Industries
32
(Jan.
1994)
available
at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kpk33a99/pdf (noting that the proposed packaging
regulations “amount to a severe infringement of internationally-registered intellectual
property rights”).
12. See Adam Harvey, Doctors’ Plan to Put Cigarettes in Plain Wrap Fails, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, July 24, 1995, at 2 (quoting the spokeswoman for the Ministry of
Health as stating that “[u]nfortunately, [the proposal] is just not feasible . . . . We would
have to buy the tobacco companies’ trademarks, and that would cost us hundreds of
millions of dollars”).
13
E ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential Medicines, 3 CHI. J.
INT’L. L. 27-46 (2002).
14
William Fisher & Cyrill Rigamonti, The South Africa AIDS Controversy: A Case Study
in Patent Law and Policy, Feb. 10, 2005 available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf
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Indeed, to the extent international public health agreements have
influenced the conduct of party states, I argue that they have done so not
because of the normative force the global health movement has exercised
on foreign policy, but precisely because of politics as usual. The efforts of
states like Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Thailand in securing
affordable access to medicines and vaccines, enforcing international
marketing codes, and fending off IP-based challenges to new public health
interventions represents one manifestation of a world in which the centers
of hard and soft diplomatic power are diffusing from Europe and North
America to Africa, Asia and South America. 15 From arms control to
climate change, this phenomenon is generally known as “multipolarity”,
distinguishing the bipolar Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. and harkening back to nineteenth century European politics
dominated by Great Powers and characterized by an ultimately unstable
balance of power between them.16
On the one hand, this trend should encourage international public
health law advocates because it increases the likelihood that international
public health agreements will achieve at least partial population health
gains through unilateral or coordinated action by middle income states.
On the other hand, the fact that international public health law is so frail in
its confrontation with international IP agreements reveals the weak role
norm creation is playing in the context of international public health law.
The Article argues that as international public health advocates press for
agreements covering a wider range of issues like alcohol control, medical
research and innovation and even a comprehensive convention on global
health, they must confront obstacles posed by international intellectual
property law more squarely than they now do, as well as shape their
agenda in light of the shifting alignment of global economic and political
power.
Part I of this Article traces the history of international public health
law from a loose network of politicized (and subsequently ineffective)
international treaties in the late nineteenth century to a comprehensive
movement toward a regime of conventions and protocols addressing the
prevention and management of health threats that cross international
borders. Part II traces the parallel history of international intellectual
property protections beginning with the 1883 Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property and growing to include a wide network of
bilateral, regional and multilateral investment and trade treaties. In Part
15

Gregory Shaffer , Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin and Barbara Rosenberg, The Trials
of Winning at the WTO: What Lies Behind Brazil's Success, 41 CORNELL INT’L. L. J.
(2008).
16
Robert Zoellick, “The End of the Third World?” (address to Woodrow Wilson Center
for International Scholars, Washington, D.C., April 14, 2010) (defining the new
multipolar world); GORDON CRAIG & ALEXANDER GEORGE, FORCE AND STATECRAFT 39
(2010); HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 23-24 (1997).
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III, I identify episodes beginning in 1994 and concluding in 2012, when
these movements collided over a range of international public health law
instruments: the 1981 WHO Guidelines on the Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes, the 2005 International Health Regulations and the 2005
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. These episodes in turn
foreshadow likely conflicts should proposals for a Framework Convention
on Alcohol Control or an even wider-reaching Framework Convention on
Global Health materialize. These episodes illustrate the weak role of
international public health law in shaping states’ behavior. In Part IV, I
recommend solutions to the current problems including the strengthening
of public health exceptions in bilateral investment treaties, the withdrawal
of certain dispute resolution procedures across a wide range of treaties, the
explicit management of intellectual property rights in future international
public health agreements and the crafting of a global public health agenda
that focuses on political practicalities available as shifts in global power
change the strength and influence of developing states.
I.

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
The end of the 20th century ushered in the era of global public health.
In the “global health revolution,”17 states have in the last 15 years not only
revised and expanded the IHR and established the FCTC, they have reoriented developing states’ public health policy trajectories through their
aid programs (like the U.S. President’s Emergency Relief for Aids in
Africa (PEPFAR)) and the development of health diplomacy. Major nongovernmental organizations like the William J. Clinton Foundation (now
the Bill, Hillary and Chelsea Clinton Foundation), the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation and the Bloomberg Family Foundation have also
allocated significant and influential parts of their giving to the alleviation
of global public health threats ranging from malaria to tobacco use. Other
major international legal efforts lie in the wait like the American Public
Health Association’s call for a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control
and even more ambitious proposals like a Framework Convention on
Global Health.18
17

David P. Fidler, After the Revolution: Global Health Politics in a Time of Economic
Crisis and Threatening Future Trends, 2 GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 2-3 available at
http://ghgj.org/Fidler_After%20the%20Revolution.pdf; See also Millenium Development
Goals, available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml (“The eight
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – which range from halving extreme poverty to
halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the
target date of 2015 – form a blueprint agreed to by all the world’s countries and all the
world’s leading development institutions”).
18
American Public Health Association, APHA Approves Framework Convention on
Alcohol Control, APHA SECTION NEWS LETTER available at
http://www.apha.org/membergroups/newsletters/sectionnewsletters/alcohol/winter07/alco
holcontrol.htm; Lawrence O. Gostin and Eric A. Friedman, Towards a Framework
Convention on Global Health: A Transformative Agenda for Global Health Justice, 13
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2013). See also
http://www.jalihealth.org/documents/Manifesto5-11-12.pdf
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Theoretically speaking, this revolution represents the growing
acknowledgment that economic development depends on a population that
enjoys access to a basic level of health care and attention to conditions that
accommodate individual and public health, the “right to the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health” under international
human rights law. 19 Practically speaking, the growth of international
public health law is a response to a globalized world of health threats
including disease outbreaks which cross international borders, food
security and safety under liberalized investment and trade rules and the
worldwide marketing of products like tobacco, alcohol and processed food
which pose unique challenges for the management of cancer, diabetes,
heart disease, hypertension and strokes.20 The economic and human cost
of these burdens is vast and growing. 21 The emergence of HIV/AIDS in
the 1980s as well as increasingly threatening strains of influenza brought
into vivid focus the inadequacy of existing international coordinating
mechanisms to handle infectious disease including the manufacturing and
distribution of medicines and vaccines. 22 Not only did the 1969
International Health Regulations only cover cholera, plague and yellow
fever, they lacked meaningful requirements for states to “detect, report,
and respond to public health emergencies.” 23
For example, tobacco consumption, the principal preventable threat to
individual and public health in both developed and developing countries,
annually kills approximately five million people worldwide and is
19

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12(1), Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. See also Constitution of World Health Organization, [preamble]
“The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental
rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief,
economic or social condition.”).
20
Emily Lee, The World Health Organization's Global Strategy on Diet, Physical
Activity, and Health: Turning Strategy Into Action, 60 FOOD DRUG L.J. 569, 571 (2005)
(“Major noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) (e.g. cardiovascular disease, diabetes,
cancers, and obesity-related health conditions) now account for nearly sixty percent of
global deaths and almost half (49.5%) of the global burden of disease. Without
intervention, NCDs are expected to contribute nearly 75% of all deaths by 2020”); David
Byrne, Is There a Lawyer in the House: the Law of Global Health, 33 JLME 19 (2005)
(“In addition, the indirect costs of ill health, such as reduced productivity, are very high.
One recent study has calculated the lifetime cost of cardiovascular disease in Germany.
Direct health care costs are estimated at $25 billion; indirect costs in productivity are
nearly double at $48 billion . . . Looking to the U.S. . . . one study estimates that the
direct and indirect costs of obesity, diabetes, and tobacco each top the $100 billion mark
annually.”).
21
Id.
22
David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostin, The New International Health Regulations: An
Historic Development for International Law and Public Health, 34 JLME 85, 86-87
(2006).
23
Kumanan Wilson, Barbara von Tigerstrom & Christopher McDougall, Protecting
Global Health Security through the International Health Regulations: Requirements and
Challenges, 179(1) CMAJ 44 (2008) available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2464486/.
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expected to kill one billion people in this century if current trends
persist.24 Liberalized trade and investment rules have shifted the massive
disease burden from tobacco consumption from developed to developing
countries.25 Indeed, this shift explains in part the origin of the FCTC.26
Similarly, the World Health Organization points to processed foods
heavily marketed toward children, expanding consumption of fast foods
and sugary beverages as important factors in the emerging global obesity
epidemic. 27
Obesity levels are rising throughout both developed and
developing countries, playing some causative role in heart disease,
diabetes, certain cancers, osteoarthritis and strokes. 28 The scope and
strength of international instruments targeting these threats has
correspondingly expanded.29
24

THEODORE H. TULCHINSKY & ELENA A. VARAVIKOVA, THE NEW GLOBAL PUBLIC
HEALTH 23 (2d ed. 2009); WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL
TOBACCO EPIDEMIC, 2008: THE MPOWER PACKAGE 7 (2008), available at
http://www.who.int/tobacco/mpower/mpower report_full_2008.pdf; Allyn L. Taylor, An
International Regulatory Strategy for Global Tobacco Control, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 257,
260–61 (1996).
25
Gro Harlem Brundtland, Burden of Disease and Best Practices: High-Level Roundtable
on Tobacco Control and Development Policy (Feb. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2003/brussels/en/.
26
Ruger, supra note 7, at 436 (2008).
27
World Health Organization, Diet, Nutrition and the Prevention of Chronic Diseases:
5.2 Recommendations for Avoiding Excessive Weight Gain and Obesity, WHO Technical
Report Series, No. 916 (TRS 916) 65-66 available at
http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/publications/trs916/en/gsfao_obesity.pdf. David
Fidler, International Law and Global Public Health, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000)
(“Liberalized trade in certain food products is also thought to contribute to obesity
problems in many countries.”).
28

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Obesity and the Economics
of Prevention: Fit Not Fat (2010) available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/19/46004918.pdf. For example, obesity cost the
Australian Government Aus$58.2 billion in 2008, according to Diabetes Australia, which
comprised Aus$8.3 billion of financial costs and Aus$49.9 billion in lost wellbeing.
Editorial: The Day of Diabetes: Coming to a Person Near You, 376 THE LANCET 1513
(Nov. 6, 2010) available at
http://download.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140673610620120.pdf.
29

See generally David P. Fidler, The Future of the World Health Organization: What
Role for International Law?, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 1079 (1998); Allyn Lise Taylor,
Making the World Health Organization Work: A Legal Framework for Universal Access
to the Conditions for Health, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 301 (1992); Just Balstad Haffield,
Harald Siem, and John-Arne Rottingen, Global Health Governance: Examining the
Global Health Arena: Strengths and Weaknesses of a Convention Approach to Global
Health Challenges, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 614, 617 (2010) (“In global health there
seems to be a drive towards adopting legally binding instruments, and the examples of
recent international regulations are numerous (e.g., 2006 United Nations Convention on
Disabilities, 2005 International Health Regulations [IHR], 2003 WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control, Medical Research and Development Treaty [current
proposal being discussed as a follow up of the Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights, Innovation and Public Health] . . .”).
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This expansion, what I refer to as the internationalization of public
health law, conceivably includes agreements and political commitments
made across several issue-areas. 30 For example, the 1949 Geneva
Conventions codified customary rules requiring access of medical
personnel to the injured and sick during armed conflicts as well as
guaranteeing prisoners of war access to some level of health care.
Similarly, arms control treaties like the NPT, the Biological Weapons
Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention are theoretically
driven by those weapons’ potentially devastating effect on human health
and life. 31 The 1978 Alma Ata Declaration and the 1993 Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action marked important turning points in
the history of the right to health without formalizing any express
commitments by governments.32 Indeed, judges, scholars, human rights
activists and law-makers have never agreed upon the content of the right
to the highest attainable standard of health since its codification in
international human rights treaties.33 For purposes of this Article, I limit
the internationalization of public health law to international legal regimes
designed to address health threats specifically those undertaken by the
World Health Organization and its predecessor International Sanitary
Conventions.
A.

The International Sanitary Conventions

The internationalization of public health law began with an effort to
coordinate national efforts to contain disease. In the middle of the
30

Ruger, supra note 7, at 424 (“In its broadest definition, [global health law] includes all
international legal regimes relevant to public health--international environmental law,
international humanitarian and human rights law, international trade and labor law,
international laws relating to arms control, and so on. Construed more narrowly, it
incorporates only those international legal regimes specifically designed to address health
threats.”).
31
David Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” Weapons, 21
MICH. J. INT’L. L. 51 (1999). Yet even in that context, the failure of the Biological
Weapons Convention to achieve the same enforcement regime strength as the Chemical
Weapons Convention is attributed in significant part to the concerns of biological agent
manufacturers that monitoring and site inspections may compromise valuable patents and
trade secrets. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg74704/pdf/CHRG106hhrg74704.pdf Frank P. Grad, Public Health Law: Its Form, Function, Future and
Ethical Parameters, 49 INT’L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 19, 21 (1998) (“[T]here is no neat
package of legislation called ‘public health law’ but rather a vast array of rules from
many difference legal areas.”
32
Sam Halabi, Participation and the Right to Health: Lessons from Indonesia, 11
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 49 (2009).
33
Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 25; ICESCR art. 12; Ruger, supra note 7,
at 426 (“During this period, appeals to human rights and the right to health in particular
have dominated international health discourse, but the human rights movement and the
right to health especially have been viewed with considerable skepticism and doubt.”).
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nineteenth century, states maintained their own standards for inspection
and quarantine of foreign goods and peoples which posed public health
threats, especially cholera. 34 Between 1851 and 1892, predominantly
European powers met in an effort to conclude a list of internationally
actionable diseases and the appropriate methods by which their spread
might be limited. The health positions taken by participating governments
and medical delegates were inevitably politicized as the etiology of each
disease (and therefore its containment) necessitated measures that affected
the commercial interests of each state.35 Britain, for example, persistently
opposed measures that imposed significant burdens on maritime trade.
Nevertheless, in 1892, the first International Sanitary Convention was
concluded which aimed to monitor westbound shipping through the Suez
Canal. 36 Between 1893 and 1903, four more international conventions
were convened, steadily expanding both diseases deemed appropriate for
cooperation and control; international adoption of national policies for
surveillance; quarantine of certain items and persons; processes for
sterilizing goods suspected of facilitating infection; and, notification
requirements for other participants. At the 1903 convention, delegates
agreed both on the need to codify in a single instrument the preceding
agreements as well as to establish an international health organization.
These objectives of the 1903 ISC continued through the conventions
held in 1912, 1926 and 1938. During this time, two international health
organizations were established and the 1903 International Sanitary
Convention was updated to reflect advances in the control of infectious
diseases. At that time, “numerous international legal regimes addressing
public health issues arose, particularly treaties dealing with . . . opium and
alcohol, occupational hazards, and transboundary pollution.” 37 As
historians of the ISC conferences observed, over time the agenda of the
international meetings moved from coordinating European responses to
disease threats originating from Asia to serving as the most important
forum for clinical researchers, bacteriologists, physicians and other
medical researchers to influence international law and international
relations as they affected the spread of disease.
The treaties’ stated objectives tended to go unfulfilled. For example,
it took seven international conventions meeting between 1851 and 1892 to
34

Norman Howard-Jones, THE SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SANITARY CONFERENCES, 1851-1938 9, WHO Geneva (1975).
35
Id.
36
David . P. Fidler, The Globalization of Public Health: The First 100 Years of
International Health Diplomacy, 79 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
842, 843 (2001).
37
Ruger, supra note 7, at 426 (“In the early part of the twentieth century, international
treaties focused on the control of narcotic drugs and ranged from the 1912 International
Opium Convention to treaties dealing with trade in alcohol.”).
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finally generate the International Sanitary Convention of 1892 which was
limited to cholera. 38 The fifth International Sanitary Convention
succeeded in creating an international health organization but it “had no
authority to do field work within a particular country, even at that
country’s request . . .”39 In its 2005 revision of the International Health
Regulations, the WHO’s Intergovernmental Working Group noted that the
IHR had been developed “to replace the largely ineffective international
sanitary conventions, which were hampered inter alia by a lack of
consistency and uniformity in their implementation . . .”40 The purposes
of the conventions became less legal in a strict sense and more
technocratic, changes which were to foreshadow the behavior of the
World Health Organization upon its establishment in 1948.41
B.

The World Health Organization

When international law-makers established the World Health
Organization (WHO), they intended to give it strong law-making and
regulatory authority.42 Article 19 of the WHO Constitution authorized it to
conclude treaties within its broadly worded mandate while Article 21 gave
the World Health Assembly the authority to adopt legally binding
recommendations in five discrete areas: sanitary and quarantine
regulations; nomenclatures on diseases, causes of death, and public health
practices; standards for diagnostic procedures for international use;
standards for safety, purity, and potency of biological, pharmaceutical, and
similar products moving in international commerce; and advertising and
labeling of biological, pharmaceutical, and similar products moving in
international commerce.43 Article 22 established the binding legal effect
of these regulations unless states opted out of them within the notification

38

WHO, Origin and Development of International Health Cooperation 7 (1991) available
at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/1991/9290211407_(chp1).pdf
39
Id. at 9.
40
WHO Intergovernmental Working Group on the Revision of the IHR, Review and
Approval of the Proposed Amendments to the International Health Regulations 2
available at http://apps.who.int/gb/ghs/pdf/IHR_IGWG2_ID2-en.pdf. Fidler and Gostin,
supra note 22, at 92 (“Previous transformations in international law's relationship with
public health have, over time, atrophied into insignificance. The history of the old IHR
tells just such a story. Further, the new IHR's relevance to some pressing global health
problems, such as increasing access to HIV/AIDS treatment in the developing world or
stemming the "brain drain" of health workers from developing to developed countries.”).
41
Fidler, supra note 27, at 1 (2000) (“In the decades since the Second World War,
international activities concerning public health carried out by intergovernmental
organizations and nongovernmental organizations made little use of international law.”).
42
George Codding, Jr. Contributions of the World Health Organization and the
International Civil Aviation Organization to the Development of International Law, 59
PROCEEDINGS OF ASIL 147 (1965).
43
WHO Constitution Article 19, 21 available at
http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf.
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period, an innovation which collapsed the usual drawn-out ratification
process historically experienced in the international law-making process. 44
WHO instead embarked upon several decades of technocratic
observation, advising and support.45 The World Health Assembly updated
the International Sanitary Regulations in 1969, but the scope and strength
of the IHR were minimal. 46 WHO focused on epidemiological and
technocratic expertise, giving itself a central coordinating role between
other international and non-governmental organizations and making far
more frequent use of its Article 23 recommendation-issuing authority. 47
The World Health Assembly regularly issued resolutions advising
governments to undertake a range of measures related to its – highly
regarded – epidemiological work but steered almost completely clear of its
law-making and regulation-issuing authority.48
1.

International Code on the Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes

After the 1969 IHR, WHO aimed at using its Article 21 powers to
address child malnutrition in the International Code on the Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes, although the policy eventually took form as an
Article 23 recommendation. In 1974, the World Health Assembly
acknowledged the declining rate of mothers exclusively breastfeeding for
the first six months of life, the period WHO recommends for both
44

WHO Constitution Art. 19, 21, 22.
Fidler and Gostin, supra note 22, at 92 (“For decades, WHO has issued
recommendations on many public health problems; but the mixed record of state
compliance with WHO guidance should temper enthusiasm for the new IHR's
recommendation provisions. The political controversies that surrounded WHO's more
aggressive actions during SARS may deter WHO from taking similar actions under the
new IHR. Laments about the erosion of global and local public health capabilities suggest
that WHO's decades-long effort to improve health conditions in developing countries has
also met with only qualified success.”).
46
Rebecca Katz & Julie Fischer, The Revised International Health Regulations: A
Framework for Global Pandemic Response, 3 GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, 1, 2
(2010), available at http://blogs.shu.edu/ghg/files/2011/11/Katz-and-Fischer_TheRevised-International-Health-Regulations_Spring-2010.pdf.
47
Ilona Kickbush, Wolfgang Hein and Gaudenz Silberschmidt, Addressing Global
Health Governance Challenges through a new Mechanism: The Proposal for a
Committee C of the World Health Assembly, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 550, 558 (2010)
(“As the United Nations technical agency for health, the WHO has been able to benefit
from another form of legitimacy based on knowledge, expertise, and evidence.
Meanwhile a wide range of expert organizations in the global arena are also able to
provide this type of legitimacy – but they do not have the link to formal legal legitimacy,
which allows the WHO to be a normative and standard setting organization.”).
48
Fidler, supra note 27, at 15 (“This isolation was not accidental but reflected a particular
outlook on the formulation and implementation of international public health policy.
WHO operated as if it were not subject to the normal dynamics of the anarchical society;
rather, it acted as if it were at the center of a transnational Hippocratic society made up of
physicians, medical scientists, and public health experts. The nature and dynamics of this
transnational Hippocratic society led WHO to approach international public health
without a legal strategy.”).
45
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maternal and child health. 49 The recommendation is not driven by
nutritional variations between breastmilk and infant formula, but by the
risks inherent in mixing (especially with contaminated water) and
administering formula as well as malnutrition that accompanies improper
or imbalanced substitutes. As Ted Kennedy phrased it:
Can a product which requires clean water, good sanitation, adequate
family income and a literate parent to follow printed instructions be
properly and safely used in areas where water is contaminated, sewage
runs in the street, poverty is severe and illiteracy high?50
The evidence is persuasive: 13% of the 10.9 million deaths of children
younger than 5 years could be prevented every year if universal protection,
promotion and support of breastfeeding were achieved. 51 In addition,
breastfeeding plays a role in spacing pregnancies where contraception is
unavailable or contraception failures are common. The declining rates of
breastfeeding were attributed to food firms’ aggressive marketing of infant
formula, other milk products, cereals for infants, vegetable mixes, and
baby teas and juices, all of which fall under WHO’s definition of
breastmilk substitutes.52 These firms’ marketing practices either asserted
or implied nutritional and other health equivalencies with, or superiority to,
exclusive breastfeeding.
Between 1977 and 1979, children’s malnutrition became a priority for
the World Health Assembly and WHO began working with UNICEF on a
framework for “regulating inappropriate sales promotion of infant foods
that can be used to replace breast milk”. 53 Those discussions revolved
around five themes: the encouragement and support of breast-feeding; the
promotion and support of appropriate and timely complementary feeding
(weaning) practices with the use of local food resources; the strengthening
of education, training and information on infant and young child feeding;
the promotion of the health and social status of women in relation to infant
and young child health and feeding; and the appropriate marketing and
distribution of breast-milk substitutes. In 1980, the World Health
Assembly endorsed the WHO/UNICEF findings and recommended that
“there should be an international code of marketing of infant formula and
other products used as breast-milk substitutes”. In early 1981, WHO
49

See Resolution WHA27.43 (Handbook of Resolutions and Decisions of the World
Health Assembly and the Executive Board, Volume II, 4th ed., Geneva, 1981, p.58).
50
Marketing and Promotion of Infant Formula In the Developing Nations, 1978:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Comm. on
Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1·2 (1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
51
See HIV, Infant Feeding and the Code 4, available at
http://www.ennonline.net/pool/files/ife/hiv,-if-and-code.pdf.
52
See International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes, available at
http://www.who.int/nutrition/publications/code_english.pdf
53
Id. at 4 fn. 2.
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endorsed a draft of the Code and recommended it to the World Health
Assembly which adopted it by an overwhelmingly vote.54
The International Code seeks to prevent companies from advertising;
implement strict labeling requirements including a proscription on infant
images or other pictures which idealize breastmilk substitutes; limit
influence on health care workers; and, prohibit distribution of free samples
of breast milk substitutes. 55 The International Code, together with
subsequent recommendations, is not a binding treaty, but represents an
evidence-based minimum standard which informs human rights
obligations. 56 Eighty-four states have enacted legislation enacting all or
some aspects of the International Code while another 14 have legislation
pending. 57 Since the International Code’s adoption, food firms have
systematically exploited its ambiguities and have directly challenged
labeling provisions that diminish intellectual property rights in trademarks
and tradenames.58
2.

International Health Regulations

The 1980s and early 1990s witnessed the emergence of new infectious
diseases like HIV as well as the resurgence of older diseases like cholera.
In 1995, the World Health Assembly instructed WHO’s Director General
to revisit the IHR precisely because they neglected “the emergence of new
infectious agents” and failed to provide for an adequate response of those
that were covered.59 The World Health Assembly attributed these failures
to the erosion of barriers between goods and people. 60 The protracted
IHR revision process overlapped with acrimonious negotiations between
developing and developed states over the inclusion of intellectual property
protections in the global free trade regime. 61 In 2003, the outbreak of

54

For the verbatim record of the discussion at the fifteenth plenary meeting, on 21 May
1981, see documentWHA34/1981/REC/2.
55
Id.
56
See U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No. 15 (2013) on
the Right of the Child to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health ¶ 44 (17 Apr. 2013).
Generally, WHA recommendations are not binding but they “carry moral or political
weight, as they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the collective membership of
the highest international body in the field of health.” Shubber, S. The International Code,
Digest of Health Legislation, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1985, p. 884.
57
UNICEF, International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes available at
http://www.unicef.org/nutrition/index_24805.html.
58
UNICEF, Protecting Breastfeeding in West and Central Africa available at
http://www.unicef.org/wcaro/WCARO_Pub_Breastfeeding.pdf
59
http://www.who.int/ihr/revisionprocess/revision/en/index.html
60
Katz & Fischer, supra note 46 at 2. The threat of the Ebola virus and the emerging
HIV/AIDS crisis (among other viruses) were major factors the global community
considered when advocating revisions to the existing IHR. Id.
61
David Fidler, The Revision of the IHR, ASIL INSIGHTS (April 2004) available at
http://www.asil.org/insigh132.cfm
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SARS – and the hesitation of the Chinese government to report or contain
it – facilitated the 2005 revisions.62
The IHR (2005) was revised to encompass the detection and
prevention of all infectious diseases. 63 Their scope was expanded “to
include any event that would constitute a public health emergency of
international concern.”64 “The Regulations now encompass public health
risks whatever their origin or source (Article 1.1), including: (1) naturally
occurring infectious diseases, whether of known or unknown etiological
origin; (2) the potential international spread of non-communicable
diseases caused by chemical or radiological agents in products moving in
international commerce; and (3) suspected intentional or accidental
releases of biological, chemical, or radiological substances.” 65
Acknowledging the importance of communication and cooperation to
successful detection and prevention of communicable diseases, States
Parties are obligated to “develop the means to detect, report, and respond
to public health emergencies . . . [and] establish a National IHR Focal
Point (NFP)66 for communication to and from WHO . . .”67 States Parties
must inform WHO within 24 hours of an assessment of any event that
could be considered a “public health risk to other States requiring a
coordinated international response.”68
The drafters of the IHR (2005) included important limitations on the
measures states could impose when facing a public health “event.” 69
These limitations may be categorized in two non-mutually exclusive ways:
1) individual human rights and 2) the harmonization of the IHR with other
international agreements. Individual rights, especially those historically
characterized as “civil” or “political”, often faced curtailment in the name

62

Katz and Fischer, supra note 46, at 2.
The stated purpose is to “prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health
response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and
restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with
international traffic and trade.” International Health Regulations (2005), WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION 1 (2005).
64
Katz & Fischer, supra note 46, at 2.
65
Fidler and Gostin, supra note 22, at 86-87.
66
The (NFP) is a “national centre, established or designated by each State Party [and]
must be accessible at all times for IHR (2005)-related communications with WHO.”
International Health Regulations (2005): Toolkit for Implementation in National
Legislation, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 1, 7 (2009), available at
http://www.who.int/ihr/NFP_Toolkit.pdf. As of July 2009, ninety nine percent of all
States have established an NFP.
67
Katz & Fischer, supra note 46, at 4.
68
Id. at 3. Once an incident has been reported, WHO will then “coordinate
communications across nations, provide technical assistance to responding nations, and
work with international scientific experts to develop recommendations for mitigating the
consequences of the event.” Id.
69
Fidler and Gostin, supra note 22, at 86-87.
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of public health measures. Isolation and quarantine, for example, impose
significant restrictions on individual liberty. Under the IHR (2005):
For a public health measure to restrict a civil and political right
lawfully, the measure must (1) respond to a pressing public or social
need; (2) pursue a legitimate aim; (3) be proportionate to the legitimate
aim; and (4) be no more restrictive than is required to achieve the
purpose sought by restricting the right. The rights-restricting measure
must also be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner
(International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
Articles 2.1 and 26).70
States Parties may implement health measures that achieve the same or
greater level of health protection as WHO recommendations but they must
be based on scientific principles, available scientific evidence, relevant
guidance or advice from WHO, and cannot be more restrictive of
international traffic or more invasive or intrusive to persons than
reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level
71
of
health
protection.

These provisions are explored, infra, as dovetailing with health
exceptions and rules of interpretation provided in WTO agreements,
especially TRIPS. Because the IHR (2005) do not have a strong
enforcement mechanism,72 this ultimately privileges WTO jurisprudence
as the benchmark by which public health measures states implement are
evaluated.
Indeed, during the IHR negotiation process:
WHO member states expressed concerns that the expanded scope of
the new IHR would bring the Regulations into conflict with other
international agencies and treaties that addressed cross-border health
risks -- e.g., the International Atomic Energy Agency (nuclear
accidents); the World Trade Organization (health measures that restrict
international trade); and the Codex Alimentarius Commission (food
standards and guidelines to protect consumer health and promote trade
in safe products). WHO addressed these concerns by demonstrating
that few conflicts existed; amending the negotiating text to remove the
small number of possible conflicts; and adding provisions to facilitate

70

Fidler and Gostin, supra note 22, at 92.
World Health Assembly, Revision of the International Health Regulations, WHA58.3
(May 23, 2005) (Articles 43.1-43.2).
72
Id. at Article 56. Fidler and Gostin, supra note 22, at 90 (acknowledging the lack of an
enforcement mechanism).
71
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cooperation and coordination between WHO and other international
organizations (e.g., Articles 14, 17(f), 57.1).”73
The first meaningful test of the IHR (2005) occurred in the context of
the outbreak of the HINI influenza virus in 2009 although the outbreak of
avian flu in Indonesia in 2007 also tested the IHR’s underlying principles.
These episodes demonstrated the confrontation between intellectual
property and public health as well as the role middle-income states played
in advancing the public health agenda. In 2007, Indonesia refused to share
flu samples precisely because of past experiences in which Western firms
patented genetic material in order to manufacture unaffordable vaccines.
3.

The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

Parallel to negotiations over the revised IHR, the World Health
Organization also oversaw the drafting of its first public health treaty, the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Just as the surge in
old and new infectious agents – tied in a significant way to globalization –
prompted calls for an improved set of International Health Regulations,
the FCTC represented the culmination of decades of public health
measures recommended by the World Health Assembly but persistently
undermined by a globally-coordinated effort undertaken by tobacco
firms.74
In 1995, Canada, Finland, Mexico, and Tanzania supported the idea of
an international agreement 75 to regulate tobacco at the World Health
Assembly (WHA), which adopted Resolution 48.11, advocating the use of
an “international instrument” to curb global tobacco consumption. 76 A
detailed outline was delivered to the WHO on July 27, 1995, setting forth
options for an international legal strategy for tobacco control and
recommending the development and implementation of a WHO
framework convention on tobacco control and related protocols to
promote global cooperation and national action.77 In 1998, Member States
finally established both a WHO FCTC Working Group to draft core treaty
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Sam Foster Halabi, The World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control: an Analysis of Guidelines Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, 39
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World Health Assembly, An International Strategy for Tobacco Control, EB95.R9,
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available
at
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Ruth Roemer, Allyn Taylor, & Jean Lariviere, Origins of the WHO Framework
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available at http://ajph.aphapublications.org/cgi/reprint/95/6/936.pdf.
74

19
elements and an Intergovernmental Negotiating Body to develop the treaty
text.78
The FCTC was designed as a compromise solution between a purely
recommendatory instrument and a binding convention. The FCTC
established evidence-based provisions for curbing global tobacco
consumption, many of which focused on the advertising, labeling,
marketing, packaging and promotion of tobacco products. 79 The
convention has been followed by additional action to enhance and clarify
the strength and scope of the treaty. 80 The progress of this action,
however, has progressed unevenly. The FCTC’s Conference of the Parties
(“COP”) quickly adopted implementing guidelines for some of the treaty’s
mandates, but struggled to adopt others. A protocol on illicit trade in
tobacco products languished for years in the COP. Notwithstanding those
efforts, the FCTC was adopted by Member States in 2003 and entered into
force on February 27, 2005. 81 One hundred and seventy-seven parties
have ratified or acceded to the FCTC as of September 2013.82
C.

Proposed Conventions

The somewhat disputed success of the International Code, the IHR and
the FCTC have led prominent public health scholars and organizations to
call for an increase in the number of issue-areas over which national
public health measures may be elevated to international fora and to call for
a more comprehensive, global approach to international public health
challenges.
1.

Framework Convention on Alcohol Control

While modest in comparison to tobacco, the disease burden imposed
by alcohol consumption is substantial. Alcohol consumption not only
results in greater harm to third parties relative to other drugs like cocaine
and heroin,83 but also has substantial deleterious effects on users, such as
78

See Working Group Preceding the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body on the WHO
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June 29, 2004, WHA56.1, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166, 42 I.L.M. 518, available at
http://www.who. int/tobacco/framework/WHO_FCTC_english.pdf.
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increased risks of cancer and heart disease, traffic accidents, burns,
poisonings, and drownings.84 Additionally, alcohol consumption facilitates
risky sexual behavior contributing to the spread of HIV/AIDS and other
sexually transmitted diseases.85
In 2010, the WHO published a report titled “Global Strategy to
Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol” (the Report)86 in which it concluded
that “2.5 million people worldwide died of alcohol-related causes in 2004,
including 320,000 young people between 15 and 29 years of age 87 .”
WHO recommended a number of interventions consistent with analogous
FCTC mandates including: educating people on the consequences of
alcohol abuse; restricting the sale of alcohol to minors; implementing
comprehensive marketing restrictions; increasing taxes on alcohol
products; and, addressing illicit or informally produced alcohol. The
Report is not binding; it merely serves as a guide for member nations
when adopting their own alcohol control laws. Organizations like the
American Public Health Association 88 and the American Society of
Addiction Medicine89, the World Medical Association as well as leading
medical journals advocated an international alcohol control treaty based in
significant part on the FCTC and WHO recommendations.90 Editors of
one of these journals, the Lancet, has also posed the question as to the
desirability of a Framework Convention on Obesity Control based in part
on WHO’s Global Strategy for Diet, Physical Activity and Health.91
2.

Framework Convention on Global Health

Without explicitly criticizing the incrementalism inherent in an issueby-issue approach to international public health law, 92 Lawrence Gostin
and his collaborators have endorsed a comprehensive approach to meet the
increasing-worldwide; Charles D.H. Parry, Alcohol Problems in Developing Countries:
Challenges for the New Millennium, 2 SUCHTMEDIZIN IN FORSCHUNG UND PRAXIS 216,
217–18 (2000) available at http://www.sahealthinfo.org/admodule/Suchtmed.pdf.
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“basic survival needs” of all humans through a Framework Convention on
Global Health.93 Uniting the broad agreement between governments on a
human right to health as well as the health-related aspects of the
Millennium Development Goals, Gostin argues that a FCGH would
address the substandard living conditions in many developing states. 94
These basic survival needs are sanitation and sewage, pest control, clean
air and water, tobacco reduction, diet and nutrition, essential medicines
and vaccines, and functioning health systems for the prevention, detection,
and mitigation of disease and premature death. 95 The Framework
Convention on Global Health would commit states to certain forms of
support for these objectives, 96 facilitate cooperation and formation of
expert communities addressing them, and impose a range of mechanisms
to enforce commitments. 97
Under the current vision of the agreement, WHO would coordinate
states’ commitment “to a set of targets, both economic and logistic, and
[the dismantling of barriers] to constructive engagement by the private and
charitable sectors.” 98 In legal terms, a FCGH could “commit states to
specific action . . . targeting the unhealthy conditions that combine with
poverty to exacerbate and perpetuate inequality.”99
The FCGH would be implemented in stages through FCTC-like
governance structures including a conference of the parties, secretariat,
technical advisory body and representative roles for civil society
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groups. 100 Initially, the FCGH would emphasize capacity building, 101
priority setting, 102 engaging stakeholders, 103 activity coordination, 104 and
progress evaluation and monitoring.105
3.

Medical Research and Innovation Treaty

Because of the controversial relationship between intellectual property
rights, the changing nature of pharmaceutical financing and innovation
and access to medicines in developing countries, the World Health
Organization has undertaken a series of studies aimed at addressing the
failure of a robust IP-rights protection regime to generate medicines and
technologies developing countries need most. 106 The diseases for which
treatments are available are too expensive because of patents and
trademarks while the diseases for which the market will likely be paltry
attract little research and development funding. 107 These efforts are
coordinated with the World Trade Organization and the World Intellectual
Property Organization as well as major international charities. In 2012,
the WHO’s Consultative Expert Working Group published Research and
Development to Meet Health Needs in Developing Countries:
Strengthening Global Financing and Coordination, in which it called for a
binding framework treaty to address innovation and research capacity in
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developing countries and to design a system to promote development of
treatments through incentive and other financing mechanisms.108
The CEWG’s report extensively covered the obstacles strong IP
protections pose for addressing medical research and development needs
in developing countries. The report squarely addressed existing IP
instruments viewing a medical research and innovation “convention not as
a replacement for the existing intellectual property rights system but as a
supplementary instrument where the current system does not function”
and emphasizing the need for research and development breakthroughs to
be developed by other researchers.109 The recommended elements of the
proposed treaty suggest the difficulties member states face for attempts to
manage IP rights in a health-based treaty. For example, the only element
of the proposed treaty which specifically mentions intellectual property
reads thusly:
encourage and support the application and management of intellectual
property in a manner that maximizes health-related innovation,
especially to meet the R&D needs of developing countries, protects
public health and promotes access to medicines for all, as well as
explore and implement, where appropriate, possible incentive schemes
for R&D.
This provision might be read to introduce some modification of the strong
IP rights that now characterize multilateral trade as well as bilateral and
regional investment treaties. It also obscures underlying disagreement –
“managing intellectual property to maximize health-related innovation”
might easily accommodate the current views of pharmaceutical patent
holders who argue that long periods of exclusive control are precisely the
kind of incentive they need to maximize health-related innovation.110
D.

Public Private Partnerships

It is in the context of the growing ties between the private and public
sectors that public health activists, scholars and organizations refer to the
growing importance of “governance” in solving public health problems at
the international level, a phrase which wraps together individuals,
governments, firms, agencies and charities. 111 Indeed, the World Health
108
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Organization’s Constitution incorporated the role of non-governmental
organizations who by 1948 had undertaken significant efforts toward
eradicating infectious diseases and caring for injured and sick persons.112
The Global Fund for example, is a public-private partnership dedicated
to collecting/allocating resources and funds for “a world free from the
burden of AIDS, [TB] and malaria.” 113 Each needs-based country has
control over its own implementation of measures to prevent the spread of
these diseases and is provided funding based on the effectiveness of the
measures used.114 Despite pockets of political unpopularity and misuse of
money, Global Fund claims to have saved 6.5 million lives since its
establishment. 115 Three million people have been provided AIDS
treatment, over 7.7 million have been treated for TB, and over 160 million
insecticide treated bed nets have been distributed.116
Similarly, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation together with WHO,
UNICEF, the World Bank and major pharmaceutical firms established the
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI) which is funded
through the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm),
which is itself funded by the governments of Australia, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United
Kingdom.117 Eligible states determine their immunization needs, apply for
funding support and administer approved vaccination programs. Under
GAVI’s Advance Market Commitment (AMC) program, donors commit
funds to guarantee the price of vaccines once they have been developed. In
absence of a central authority which lead to a specific outcome. It has frequently been
associated with "governance without government,” a view that is increasingly challenged
as the role of states in the global governance system is better understood.”). Nan D.
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exchange, companies promise to provide the vaccines at an affordable
price to developing countries.118
Global Fund and GAVI represent just two examples of public-private
partnerships which number in the hundreds and health-related NGOs
which number in the tens of thousands.119 The participation of major nongovernmental organizations in global public health is not new, although
the innovations current ones are introducing into administration and
management are. 120 In some ways, public-private partnerships are better
able to balance IP rights with their public health missions working, as they
do, within the strong patent regimes donors generally enjoy. 121 Global
Fund and GAVI, for example, are theoretically able to manage a range of
supplier behaviors through their contracts.122
II.

THE EXPANSION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN TRADE AND
INVESTMENT TREATIES

With the exception of public-private partnerships, the international
coordination agreements outlined above are dependent on traditional
notions of treaty compliance including reciprocity, transparency,
legitimacy, mobilization and vertical integration (i.e. international rules
and standards are internalized into national law). 123 There are weak or no
118
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enforcement mechanisms to speak of, the benefits of coordination and
mobilization serving as their own justifications. Whatever the strengths of
these justifications, they are threatened by a nearly perfectly parallel
development in international law: international intellectual property
protection. Yet unlike the enforcement mechanisms embedded in
international public health law instruments, intellectual property rights
holders enjoy, almost uniformly, enforceable rights in these international
agreements, even when they conflict with public health measures.
These agreements range from the protections given intellectual
property rights holders under regional and multilateral trade treaties to the
broad scope of legal protections given both “investors” and “investments”
under bilateral investment treaties. The upshot of these parallel,
contradictory legal mechanisms is the frustration of global health law
objectives like reduced tobacco use, expanded access to vaccines in the
event of pandemic or even the mutual trust necessary for international
public health treaties to work. The end result is that robust IP protection
works in persistent opposition to public health objectives.124
A.

The 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property

Contemporaneously with late nineteenth century efforts to establish the
first international public health law treaties, a small group of states also
sought to protect their citizens’ industrial and intellectual properties as
they moved across borders. 125 Disparate national patent and trademark
regimes meant that rights holders in one state might lose patent or
trademark protection in another if they did not simultaneously file for
protection in all relevant states. 126 Like public health law, intellectual
property law was essentially national in nature though growing
international trade mobilized efforts at an international approach to legal
barriers for IP. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property created a legal union between participating states in which
foreign industrial design, patent and trademark applications received the
same treatment as national applications; covered intellectual property first
protected in one state received priority in other participating states; and,
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codified some common substantive protections. 127 The treaty also
specifically addressed forms of unfair competition not related to patents or
trademarks, provisions which were subsequently strengthened when the
parties revised the treaty in several conferences from 1886 to 1967.
Membership in the treaty grew from 11 parties in 1883 to 174 in 2013.
While the treaty never specifically addressed the relationship between
international intellectual property protection and public health, it did
create exceptions foreshadowing the principal conflicts occurring between
1994 and 2012. Compulsory licenses were always contemplated for
public health reasons while the addition of Article 6quinquies(B)(iii) in
1934 allowed the denial of registration or the invalidation of trademarks
which might mislead consumers. 128 In short, the Paris Convention, later
incorporated into the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement, provided broad
exceptions for the compulsory licensing of patents related to medicines as
well as the prohibition on trademarks that might create false impressions
as to products’ health-related attributes.129
Like public health treaties originating at the same time, the Paris
Convention tended to suffer from underenforcement as well as the absence
of a specific forum to which an aggrieved IP rights holder might resort.
Compliance and complaint were largely diplomatic matters. 130 For
example, the international organization created to administer the Paris
Convention and, later, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works – the United International Bureaux for the Protection
of Intellectual Property (BIRPI – its French acronym131) – never enjoyed
more than a formal coordinating role and was, strictly speaking, an arm of
the Swiss government. 132
From 1893 to 1967, BIRPI oversaw revisions to the major treaties
including the ways in which the agreements would govern new
technologies; entry by newly independent former colonies; and, increasing
efforts to include substantive law in the treaties.133 In 1967, the parties
127
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agreed to transform BIRPI into an international organization, the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which operated formally from
1970 and as a specialized agency of the United Nations from 1974. WIPO
has largely overseen the growing body of IPR harmonization and
substantive law treaties like the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Trademark
Law Treaty and the (slowly forming) Substantive Patent Law Treaty.
Indeed, it is funded largley through the fees paid by private users of the
treaties it develops.134 Because WIPO became a specialized agency of the
United Nations in the same period that developing and newly independent
states were pressing for a New International Economic Order, it never
fully served the interests of strong international intellectual property
protections. 135
B.

International Trade Law

International intellectual property law became decidedly more
influential when it was not only folded in with the international free trade
regime, but was equipped with judicial enforcement requirements that
gave IP rights holders the capability to enforce those rights in domestic
courts and administrative tribunals. Because the Paris Convention and
other efforts at international IP protection had failed to satisfy the
demands of states with strong IP rights-holding constituencies, individual
states had often regulated IP practices through domestic trade statutes.
For example, in the United States, Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act
“authorizes the President to take all appropriate action, including
retaliation, to obtain the removal of any act, policy, or practice of a foreign
government that violates an international trade agreement or is unjustified,
unreasonable, or discriminatory, and that burdens or restricts U.S.
commerce.” Private IP rights holders were authorized to file 301 petitions,
many of which focused on failures to protect IP rights abroad. In 1988,
Congress enhanced Section 301 by requiring the Office of the US Trade
Representative to compile “Special 301” Reports which identify countries
which do not provide “adequate and effective” protection of intellectual
property rights or “fair and equitable market access to United States
persons that rely upon intellectual property rights”. 136 Yet even efforts
like these confront diplomatic and political limits. For example, the 2011
Report identified two key US allies, Canada and Israel, as having “serious
intellectual property rights deficiencies” yet resolving those deficiencies is
likely to be complicated by other diplomatic, commercial and strategic
priorities. Therefore, from states with powerful IP rights-holding

134

Id. at 24.
See John Hughes, A Short History of "Intellectual Property" in Relation to Copyright,
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1293, 1299 (2012).
136. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2009 SPECIAL 301
REPORT 3, 8–9, 17, 20, 25, 31 (2009).
135

29
constituencies, the desirability of an agreement that gave automatic rights
to enforceability was obvious.
1.

The WTO

After the failure of the International Trade Organization to obtain US
support during the Truman administration, the less centralized General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became the organizing treaty
under which states reduced official or governmental barriers to trade.
Through eight rounds of negotiations stretching over more than 40 years,
trading states gradually lowered tariffs as well as “non-tariff barriers” to
trade like customs procedures, import licensing requirements and export
subsidies.
The so-called Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations
commenced in 1986 and lasted through 1994, when the World Trade
Organization was established.
The “World Trade Organization” refers to about 60 agreements, several
of which affect participating states’ ability to establish and regulate their
health systems. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
governs potentially trade restrictive public health regulations while the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) requires that states pass laws providing intellectual-property
rights holders with a number of administrative and judicial protections.
The Agreement on Sanitary and Photosanitary Measures (SPS) establishes
the principles by which states may regulate food safety. While the WTO
agreements provide for relatively circumscribed situations in which public
health measures may prevail over liberal trading rules, only other States
Parties may avail themselves of the WTO’s strong dispute settlement
mechanisms. 137
2.

TRIPS

TRIPS is by far the most controversial of the WTO agreements with
respect to international public health law.138 Unlike the general theory of
reducing barriers to trade which justified GATT, TRIPS was theoretically
justified by the need to increase legal protections to intellectual property
rights holders in order to faciliate expansion of products, processes (and
their distinguishing symbols) as well as creative works into new
markets.139
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Most economists agree that in most circumstances, eliminating barriers
to trade between nations is net welfare increasing for each nation and
for the global economy. Indeed, economists argue that a state should
adopt open trade policies even if others do not. As Paul Krugman puts
it, “[i]f economists ruled the world, there would be no need for a
World Trade Organization. The economist's case for free trade is
essentially a unilateral case: a country serves its own interests by
pursuing free trade regardless of what other countries may do . . .”
The issue of the optimal level of intellectual property protection,
however, is not so straightforward. Most economists agree that
nations should adopt some intellectual property laws, although what
the content of these laws should be is a matter of significant
disagreement. Intellectual property rules involve distributional
issues.140
TRIPS grants patent, copyright and trademark holders rights to certain
minimal statutory protections as well as resort to administrative and
judicial processes to enforce those rights. 141 Member states may pass
protections greater than those detailed in TRIPS 142 but additional
protections must be extended to nationals of other member states. 143 In
addition to substantive provisions, TRIPS also outlines a comprehensive
framework for civil adjudication of IP rights. 144 Member States must
create private causes of action 145 as well as remedies including
injunctions, money damages, and the use of border restrictions.146 States
must also give IP rights holders access to judicial review of all
administrative decisions concerning their IP laws.147
Prior to the Uruguay Round, the trade liberalization negotiation
process had been largely driven by the trade agenda of developed states;
agriculture was for the most part excluded and the important bargains
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were struck between the industrialized countries.148 The Uruguay Round,
by contrast, involved a greater range of issues many of which were longstanding priorities of developing states. Their interests in lowering
barriers to trade in agricultural goods, clothes and textiles resulted in a
“grand bargain” in which they agreed to impose strong monopoly
protections for copyrights, trademarks, and, most importantly from the
North American, Japanese and European perspective, copyrights and
patents.149
With respect to the relationship between the international public
health law movement and the international intellectual property protection
movement, the Uruguay Round decidedly subordinated the former to the
latter.
Developing states won some flexibilities with respect to
implementation of TRIPS obligations, including Articles 7 and 8 which
respectively emphasized the need for intellectual property rules to allow
for development, technology transfer and measures necessary to protect
public health and nutrition.150 Article 8 did not provide a general public
health exemption from TRIPS implementation but rather conditioned
those measures on TRIPS compliance.151 Article 31 of TRIPS allows for
the nonconsensual authorizations of patents – a provision whose
importance was elevated by the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health – but requires that those authorizations be
accompanied by appellate access to national courts or “higher
administrative authorities.”152
These protections effectively imparted individually enforceable
rights to IP rights holders. Jerome Reichmann detailed how strong these
rights may be: “[Developed countries] expect developing countries to
implement [their] obligations concerning domestic, judicial and
administrative enforcement of foreigners’ intellectual property rights,
including detailed provisions governing the discovery of evidence, rights
to counsel, injunctions, damages and temporary restraining orders. These
148
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provisions mean business.”153 States Parties are not required to allocate
more resources toward enforcement of IP rights than “law in general”, so
many individual IP rights-holders may not see a sufficient payoff to invest
resources in pursuing individual civil actions to vindicate property rights.
But the economic sectors most closely tied to human health – food,
tobacco, alcohol and pharmaceuticals – are precisely those in which IP
rights holders are likely to try and preserve substantial investments in
advertising, research and development. 154
3.

SPS and TBT Agreements

Relatedly, measures affecting the labeling of food or beverage
containers may not only be challenged as they affect trademarks on
packaging and labeling, but also as trade restrictive under the SPS and
TBT agreements. These agreements do not apply to intellectual property
rights per se but may, together with IP rights claims, cumulatively weigh
against public health interventions. The SPS Agreement authorizes states
to adopt “sanitary and phytosanitary” measures to ensure the safety of
food and the prevention of imported pests and diseases, but limits the trade
restrictiveness of those measures and encourages the use of internationally
accepted standards like those issued by the Codex Alimentarius
Commission (Codex). 155 Empowering Codex standards for their WTO
relevance has correspondingly pressured decisions toward their free trade
compatibility. Emily Lee has detailed this process in the following way:
The standard-setting process seems to present a unique “democratic”
setting in which industry representatives, government officials, and
NGOs can negotiate and forge a unified position, but in practice, the
distribution of influence is weighted heavily to reflect industry
concerns. The composition of national delegations in Codex meetings
increasingly reflects the commercial importance of Codex decisions,
as does the increasing difficulty in the negotiation of general principles
for the elaboration of standards. Proceedings of the Commission often
have turned into trade battlegrounds and forums for deregulation

153

Reichman, supra note 8, at 385.
Brewster, supra note 140, at 32 (“[T]he civil system might, in practice, be far more
important than the administrative or criminal system if foreign rights-holders are willing
to bear the costs of detecting and prosecuting intellectual property infringements . . . . In
areas such as pharmaceuticals, private suits are cost-effecive because the capacity to
reverse engineer and reproduce pharmacueticals is not as widespread. There may be only
a few firms in the country.”).
155
Antonia Eliason, Science Versus Law in WTO Jurisprudence: The (Mis)Interpretation
of the Scientific Process and the (In)Sufficiency of Scientific Evidence in EC-Biotech, 41
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 341 (2009).
154

33
where decisions tend to reflect political compromises designed to
promote international trade at the expense of human health156
European Union officials, for example, argued in 1994 that US nutrition
labels restricted trade.157
Similarly, the TBT Agreement encourages states to base regulatory
measures on international standards when available and appropriate. The
easiest way to accomplish this is by adopting an accepted international
standard like those issued by the International Standards Organization
(ISO). However, the process by which those standards are developed are
not only opaque, they are dominated by the industries affected by the
standards issued.
The tobacco industry, for example, used the ISO
standard for low tar labeling as part of its broader effort to convince the
public that a “safer” cigarette existed.158
4.

The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and the TransPacific Partnership Agreement

The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 159 represents the
codification of principles advanced in a number of initiatives undertaken
by developed states to enhance protections for intellectual property
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holders beyond what TRIPS achieved. 160 According to the U.S. Trade
Representative, “the goal [of ACTA] is to set a new, higher benchmark for
enforcement that countries can join on a voluntary basis . . . ACTA will
include commitments in three areas: (1) strengthening international
cooperation, (2) improving enforcement practices, and (3) providing a
strong legal framework for IPR enforcement.”161 After eleven rounds of
negotiations, the final ACTA text was adopted162 in May 2011.163
Originally aiming to combat the counterfeiting of goods and piracy
in international markets, ACTA contains increased criminal sanctions for
IPRs infringement and stronger border measures 164 to target illegal
trafficking in infringing goods through customs processes. 165 ACTA
requires, under each Parties' available laws, “enforcement procedures . . .
to permit effective action against any act of infringement of [IPRs]
covered by [ACTA] . . ..”166 While commentators have detailed criticisms
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of those measures specifically (especially border controls), this section
will focus on ACTA’s civil enforcement provisions.167
Under ACTA, “[e]ach party shall make available to [IPRs] holders
civil judicial procedures concerning the enforcement of any [IPR] . .
....” 168 Among those procedures are injunctions, 169 damages, 170 other
remedies, 171 and the collection and preservation of evidence. 172 These
civil enforcement provisions are not limited to first-party infringers.
“Each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings concerning he
enforcement of intellectual property rights, its judicial authorities shall
have the authority to order against a party to desist from infringement an
order to that party or where appropriate to a third party over whom he
relevant judicial authority exercises jurisdiction . . . to prevent infringing
good from entering the channels of commerce.
ACTA represents a new restructuring of civil enforcement to
increase the rights of IP holders, with potentially deleterious effects on
access to medicines. 173 For example, because ACTA requires that judicial
authorities have the power to issue injunctions against third parties, any
intermediary provider of generic medicines to developing countries
potentially faces liability under the ACTA regime.174
In the context of access to medicines, the concept “intermediary
services” may be quite ominous. Services are obviously provided by
ISPs allowing supplier to market medicines online and in the
167
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pharmaceutical context by shipping agents . . . Perhaps more
ominously, many others who helped fund or facilitate purchases of
generic drugs, as they moved through the stream of international
commerce from producer to consumer could face intermediary liability.
For example, the Global Fund solicits and funds country-led proposals
for funding priority disease prevention, treatment and care.175
ACTA compliant laws may enable foreign rights holders to target
local industries through threats or use of litigation.176 The force of the
agreement extends beyond its power to shape domestic law as it will
inevitably also form the template for future bilateral agreements between
ACTA and non-ACTA states. 177 The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
Partnership Agreement or TPP mimicks many of ACTA’s IP provisions,
although its conclusion is more distant.178
C.

Bilateral and Regional Trade and Investment Treaties

More common than broad, multilateral trade instruments like TRIPS
and ACTA, bilateral and regional investment and trade agreements contain
some of the strongest protections for intellectual property. 179 Bilateral
investment and treaties (BITs), for example, take a number of forms and
include provisions authorizing IP rights-holders to vindicate claims in
national or international courts or dispute resolution fora. Generally, BITs
are negotiated between developed states and developing states.180 BITs
contain provisions guaranteeing investors from one state protections for
their “investments” in the other state which are often to define IP rights in
broad terms. These guarantees may include fair and equitable or nondiscriminatory treatment,181 free transfer of profits and currency, and, in
many cases, payment of compensation should a host state adopt measures
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having the effect of direct or indirect expropriation. 182 The origin and
number of BITs in existence is well-documented, although the reasons for
their proliferation remain in dispute.183 At the end of the 1980s, records at
the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development showed 385 BITs; a
decade later, the number reached 1,857; current estimates show
approximately 3,000 BITs in force.184
BITs do not, typically, include enumerated rights for contracting
states outside their ability to prohibit certain economic activities
altogether, exempt certain economic sectors from the treaty’s applicability
or to take normal regulatory action in the interest of national security,
public order, public health or public morality—so-called “non-precluded
measures.” 185 Contracting states are still potentially obligated to
compensate investors for these “regulatory takings.” Public health
exceptions, for example, are often phrased in vague ways in the preamble,
undermining their use as a defense to an investor claim.186 Most of these
treaties provide investors access to one of the major international arbitral
tribunals to vindicate rights under a BIT.187
These treaties often give much stronger protection, with fewer
standard exceptions, to intellectual property rights than international IP
agreements, TRIPS or domestic law. For example, the standard Swiss BIT
protects as investments “copyrights, industrial property rights (such as
patents, utility models, industrial drawings or models, manufacturer’s or
commercial marks, trade names, indications of provenance or appellations
d’origine contrôlées (AOC, or “controlled terms of origin”), know-how
and clientele” and requires the counterparty to compensate an investor for
182
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“measures, [taken] directly or indirectly, of expropriation, nationalization,
or any other measure having the same character or same effect.”188 Under
the 2012 US Model BIT, an “investment means every asset that an
investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly . . . include[ing] . . .
intellectual property rights” which are accorded similar rights to
arbitration although the U.S. Model BIT creates an explicit nexus between
rights to compensation and measures consistent with TRIPS.189
Indeed, if TRIPS represented the ceiling of substantive IP rights and
accompanying enforcement agreements, the entire debate on the balance
between TRIPS and public health might focus on flexibilities available in
the language of the agreement.190 But flexibilities WTO member states
might enjoy under TRIPS are narrowed, sometimes drastically, in bilateral
investment and trade treaties. For example, the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade
Agreement includes limitations on compulsory licenses and parallel
imports. The costliest TRIPS-plus terms are those that impose “data
exclusivity” separate from patent protection. Under “data exclusivity”
regimes, a generic manufacturer is not allowed to use clinical and safety
trial data used with the initial drug application, essentially requiring the
generics applicant to undertake prohibitively expensive clinical trials and
re-imposing the cost to the government or end-user that generics
theoretically exist to save.
These expenditures have required that both public health system and
individuals pay higher prices for many new medicines that are needed to
treat serious non-communicable diseases (NCDs), such as hypertension,
asthma, diabetes, and mental illness. For example, new medicines to
treat diabetes and heart disease cost anywhere from two to six times
more in Jordan than in Egypt, where there are no TRIPS-plus barriers.191
Similar conflicts have arisen over alcohol, food and tobacco
regulation. When Uruguay introduced measures restricting the images,
colors, words and phrases which could appear on cigarette packages,
Phillip Morris International’s Swiss subsidiaries challenged the
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constitutionality of the regulations under Uruguayan law.192 PMI failed in
the Uruguay courts before ultimately availing itself of a bilateral
investment treaty between Switzerland and Uruguay which not only gave
PMI’s trademarks much stronger protections than under either
international trade or Uruguayan law, but also placed significant
limitations on the Uruguayan courts to serve as the final authority on the
dispute.193
III.

CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN IP RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
HEALTH LAW

As international public health law and international intellectual
property law have strengthened, so have the conflicts anticipated by each
movement’s advocates. Between 1994 and 2012, the conflict between
international intellectual property rights and international public health
law confronted each of the major agreements outlined above and
foreshadowed potential agreements under instruments like the Medical
Research and Innovation Treaty, the Framework Convention on Alcohol
Control and the Framework Convention on Global Health. As the
discussion of these episodes shows, international public health law
exercised little normative force over strong intellectual property rights.
Instead, international public health law norms prevailed most often when
sponsored by a strong middle income state like Brazil, India, South Africa
or Thailand.194
A.

Guatemala, Brazil, India, the Philippines and the 1981 WHO Code on
the Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes

Guatemala represents precisely the kind of state for which the 1981
WHO Code on the Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes was intended.
In health, the infant mortality rate is 55 per 1,000 live births and the
maternal mortality rate is 110 per 100,000 live births. In addition,
approximately 16 percent of infants suffer from low birth weight, and
approximately 50 percent of all children are malnourished.195
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In 1983, Guatemala adopted law 66-83, Law on the Protection of
Breastfeeding, which codified many aspects of the WHO International
Code, and in 1987, the Ministry of Health implemented the law through
Governmental Order No. 847-87. In 1992, Gerber applied to introduce a
new “step-by-step” product line in Guatemala and requested that the
products be registered with the Food & Drugs Registration and Control
Division, an equivalent of the US FDA. The FDRC required that Gerber
remove its trademarked infant image, include a notice that “breastmilk is
the best for baby” as required under the law and further specify the age of
the child for which the products were intended.
Gerber pursued a three-prong strategy in response: asserting the
products were “complementary” foods under Guatemalan law and
therefore not covered by 66-83 and 841-87; bringing a statutory action
under U.S. law to eliminate Guatemala’s trading preferences for
effectively “nationalizing” its trademark; and, threatening Guatemala’s
compliance with (still pending) TRIPS provisions. Gerber argued that:
Article 15 of [TRIPS] states that “The nature of the goods or services
to which a trademark is to be applied shall in no case form an obstacle
to registration of the trademark” In addition, Article 20 of the proposed
agreement provides in relevant part that “The use of a trademark in the
course of trade shall not be unjustifiably encumbered by special
requirements, such as . . . use in a special form or use in a manner
detrimental to its capability to distinguish the goods . . . .196
Applying a strained interpretation of “complementary foods”, the
Guatemala Supreme Court of Justice determined that 66-83 and 841-87
applied only to locally prepared foods, not to imported goods. Without
explicitly acknowledging the role that the trade-based agreements played
in their construction of the law, the case “shows . . . that raising the spectre
of the new WTO can be an effective pressure tool against small countries
that want to implement strong health regulations that may also have
197
negative
impacts
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interests.”
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restrictions through similar arguments based in part on the trade restrictive
effect of warnings on formula containers.198
Brazil, by contrast, fully incorporated the Code into law in 1988,
embedded subsequent WHA resolutions into administrative regulations,
and authorized third-party monitoring. Breastfeeding rates have risen
steadily as a result. 199 Like Guatemala’s law, Brazil prohibited infant
images on breastmilk substitute packaging. When Gerber entered the
Brazilian market, it accepted the prohibition on its infant image. Similarly,
in India, where the Infant Milk Substitutes Act adopted a prohibition on
images of infants, women, or “phrases designed to increase the saleability
of infant milk substitutes or infant food,” exclusive breastfeeding at 4-5
months of age is 46%, three times that of the Philippines. 200
B.

Brazil, India, South Africa, Thailand and Access to Medicines

Access to medicines was a principal concern of developing states
during the TRIPS negotiations. Many developing states considered the
high prices that accompanied patented medicines and their production
processes to frustrate their constitutional and international human rights
obligations to provide affordable health care to their citizens.
1.

Compulsory Licenses and Parallel Imports

In addition to the generally worded provisions in Articles 7 and 8,
TRIPS also includes a compulsory license regime under which member
states may authorize third-party firms to manufacture patented products or
use patented processes. 201 Article 31 obligates states to negotiate with
patent holders over the terms of these licenses unless it involved a “case of
a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.” 202
TRIPS does not explicitly address parallel import policies, which are used
to purchase patented drugs from a third state where a lower price is
charged.
Beginning with South Africa’s experience with parallel imports in
1997, Brazil, India, South Africa and Thailand have not only led in using
these alternatives to expand access to medicines for their own citizens but
to obtain collective gains for developing countries generally. The
198
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confrontation between South Africa and Western pharmaceutical firms,
paralleled by Brazil’s compulsory license regime for AIDS drugs,
achieved at least two key victories. First, sponsoring governments
withdrew opposition to compulsory licensing for HIV medications.
Second, the episodes prompted states to revisit the TRIPS agreement in
light of outbreaks and reemergence of infectious diseases with
disproportionate effects in developing countries. The 2001 Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement on Public Health emphasized the
importance of compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria
and other epidemics, as well as affirming the freedom for states to
establish their own regimes for parallel imports. 203 The final text was
ultimately negotiated between the U.S. and Brazil.204
In 2007, Thailand expanded the use of compulsory licenses beyond the
communicable diseases specified in Doha, granting a compulsory license
for the heart disease medication marketed as Plavix. Thailand also issued
compulsory licenses for four cancer drugs, the disease burden of which is
heavier than HIV/AIDS. 205 From the Thai government's point of view,
cancer "is no less serious than HIV/AIDS . . . .”206 In 2012, India granted
a compulsory license for kidney and liver cancer medications.207 Indeed,
since 1995, “more than half the compulsory licensing episodes occurred in
upper middle income countries (including Brazil and Thailand).”208
These episodes might be equally construed as protecting powerful
domestic industries (India’s generics firms) 209 rather than any form of
solidarity these states feel with the plight of developing countries facing
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large disease burdens.210 That is the point. It is may not be norm creation
or force flowing from the Doha Declaration that has resulted in
compulsory license activity, but rather the political and economic strength
of the licensing states that has allowed wider access to affordable
medicine, even as international intellectual property protections become
stronger and more widespread.
2.

TRIPS Flexibilities and Model Laws

Compulsory licenses and parallel imports are relatively drastic actions
to narrow otherwise strong patent rights. States enjoy a number of other
ways in which strong intellectual property rights called for in TRIPS can
be diminished. For example, states are under no obligation to allocate
greater resources to criminal enforcement of IP rights, leaving IP rights
holders the civil justice system to vindicate their rights, although as noted
above, this flexibility may not deter patent and trademark holders in the
areas most closely related to health.
States are also free to establish their own standards for patentability,
including novelty, non-obviousness and utility. 211 For example, India
passed a patent protection statute which presumptively meets the
minimum requirements of TRIPS, granting 20 year exclusivity, for
example, but defining “novelty” and “efficacy” in ways that prevent firms
from “evergreening” their patents by filing patent applications with
marginally different applications or modalities from the protected
patents. 212 Novartis, which had attempted to extend the patent on its
cancer treatment drug Gleevec, lost in India’s trial courts on even
establishing the grounds for a new patent. India’s Intellectual Property
Appellate Board (which had assumed jurisdiction over patents as a result
of TRIPS) determined that it had in fact met the basic requirements of
patentability but failed scrutiny under a more specific provision of India’s
patent act which erected a high barrier for drug efficacy. The Supreme
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Court of India affirmed the IPAB’s decision that the patent failed India’s
criteria for novelty.213
Section 3(d) of India’s Patent Act limiting the possibility of
evergreening patents is in the process of being replicated in the Philippines
while other developing nations are likely to use that section as a model.214
Brazil’s compulsory licensing for AIDS drugs has served as model for
other Latin American jurisdictions. 215 In addition, Brazil has brokered
collective bargains on behalf of Latin American governments seeking
lower prices for medicines.216
3.

Action at the World Trade Organization

In 2008 and 2009, Dutch customs authorities seized at least 19
shipments of generic drugs transiting through the Netherlands, 16 of
which originated in India.217 Brazil and India initiated proceedings at the
World Trade Organization to challenge the Dutch and European laws
under which the seizures were authorized. The states secured a promise
from the EU in July 2011 to end the seizures, but Dutch authorities seized
another 29 cartons of medicine in December 2012 and EU negotiators
have balked at specifically addressing the border seizures in ongoing
negotiations over an EU-India Free Trade Agreement.218 While Brazil and
Indian complaints are technically in abeyance as long as the EU abides by
its agreement, their complaints challenge a wide range of current IP
practices in developed states. While larger markets like Brazil, India and
Thailand have managed to withstand pressure to include these kinds of
provisions in investment and trade agreements, smaller markets, often
where the diseases impose higher morbidity and mortality, are buckling.
213
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C.

Indonesia and the International Health Regulations

The International Health Regulations depend on a number of
identification, communication and treatment mechanisms to address
potential pandemics.
Vaccines, for example, are one of the most
important lines of defense against the emergence of pandemics. 219 The
development and distribution of vaccines are dependent on patents on
“genetic sequences or proteins of the pandemic virus, as well as on novel
methods for vaccine production, the actual vaccine,” in addition to
chemicals which maximize the number of doses available from a given
antigen or virus. 220
Strong patent protections pose at least two related threats to the
functionality of the IHR. First, the infrastructure and technology for
vaccine development is overwhelmingly located in industrialized, wealthy
states. 221 This concentration renders developing states potentially
dependent on wealthier states to manufacture and distribute vaccines in
sufficient quantities to address their needs in the case of disease outbreaks.
Second, the origin of outbreaks, especially influenza, is often in
developing states like China, Indonesia and the Middle East. These states
must therefore be willing to share disease samples and biological material
relevant to risk assessment, risk management, disease research and
vaccine development. When firms patent shared samples to produce
unaffordable vaccines, the willingness to share is undermined.222
In 2006, Indonesia withheld H5N1 avian flu samples from WHO,
undermining efforts to monitor and produce vaccines in response to an
avian flu outbreak that rapidly spread worldwide. 223 Indonesia asserted
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that its decision was a response to an Australian company’s development
of a vaccine derived from a virus sample Indonesia provided to WHO. 224
The cycle demonstrated the inequities inherent in the global disease
surveillance system established by the IHR:
Developing countries provided information and virus samples to the
WHO-operated system; pharmaceutical companies in industrialized
countries then obtained free access to such samples, exploited them,
and patented the resulting products, which the developing countries
could not afford.225
Participation by Indonesia is in many ways crucial to the global
surveillance system. As David Fidler noted, “[w]ithout access to
Indonesia’s influenza strains, global surveillance was jeopardized, as was
the refinement of diagnostic reagents and the development of intervention
strategies, which depend on the information surveillance provides.”
In 2009, the outbreak of H1N1 influenza in Mexico demonstrated
not only that the global surveillance system benefited Western
pharmaceutical firms, but that in the case of a real pandemic, those firms’
sponsoring governments could not be relied upon to equitably share
vaccines:
Canada awarded its vaccine contract to a Canadian company
because it feared that foreign governments might restrict exports to
Canada because of vaccine shortages within their territories. The
Australian government made it clear to the Australian
manufacturer CSL that it must fulfill the government’s domestic
needs before exporting vaccine to the United States. The United
States pledged on September 17, 2009, to donate 10% of its
vaccine purchases to WHO, but on October 28, US Secretary of
Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius stated that the
United States would not donate H1N1 vaccine as promised until all
at risk Americans had access, because production problems had
created shortages in the United States.226
Despite clear acknowledgment that the 2009 outbreak originated in
Mexico and leveled its most significant toll there, Mexico had "a
terrifically difficult time getting access to the pandemic vaccine.”227
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As a result of these episodes, developing countries led by Indonesia
pressed both WHO and developed states to conclude an agreement on
equitable access to pandemic vaccines. In 2011, the WHO Open-Ended
Working Group of Member States on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
(PIP) finalized an agreement in which developing countries agreed to
routinely share mutating flu virus samples in exchange for set-asides of
vaccine doses available at reduced or no cost and monetary support
commitments from vaccine manufacturers. Even at that, the PIP
framework was adopted under WHO’s Article 23 recommendatory power,
not its Article 19 treaty power nor its Article 21 regulation-issuing
authority and the Standard Material Transfer Agreements appended to it
are largely deferential to the patent interests of manufacturers.228
D.

Australia, Uruguay and the FCTC

As with the International Code and the IHR, the WHO’s Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control engenders confrontations with intellectual
property rights, primarily trademarks. At least three of the FCTC tobaccodemand reduction provisions involve or potentially involve conflicts with
trademarks, especially on packaging and labeling. 229 Indeed, the visual
imagery fundamentally tied to trademarks represents a chief investment by
tobacco firms, which use visual and written cues to prompt and manipulate
demand for tobacco products. 230 For example, tobacco firms not only
introduced “light”, “mild” and “ultra-light” in their brands to suggest to
consumers that “light” versions of cigarettes were safer, they adapted label
and packaging color schemes to convey that message:
White-and-gold Marlboro Lights will still suggest “lightness” just by
the stark contrast to the red, full-strength Marlboros. The powder-blue
Camel Lights with their pastel camel will still look milder than the
ornery desert-ocher animalon the regular “Filters” pack.231
The South American republic of Uruguay implemented a number of
FCTC compliant tobacco control measures between 2008 and 2010,
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including two which addressed the manipulation of packaging and
labeling to shape health perceptions of tobacco products. First, the state
required that pictorial warnings cover eighty percent of a cigarette pack’s
surface. Second, the Ministry of Health limited the sale of cigarettes to
only one variety per brand, the so-called single presentation
requirement.232 This part of the law prevents a firm from selling multiple
varieties of cigarette under a single trademark. For example, Philip Morris
International (PMI), whose most important asset is the Marlboro brand,
could no longer sell Marlboro “Reds,” Marlboro “Greens,” and Marlboro
“Blues,” which leaves “Marlboros” as its only authorized variety
(although it owns or licenses other brands in the Uruguayan market).233
PMI first challenged the regulations in Uruguayan courts, seeking an
injunction based in part on Uruguay’s revised, TRIPS-compliant
trademark law. Unsuccessful in Uruguayan courts, PMI initiated (through
entities it controlled) arbitration proceedings under Switzerland’s BIT with
Uruguay. That treaty included not only broad definitions of “investor”
and “investment”, it also established narrow and toothless exceptions for
public health regulation and required even laws passed with assurance of
due process to compensate an investor for an “indirect” expropriation.234
Despite the regulations falling squarely within the measures recommended
by the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (especially the Article
11 guidelines), the Uruguayan government vacillated on withdrawing or
moderating the measures until strong financial and political support
emerged from the Bloomberg Family Foundation, the World Health
Organization and hundreds of public health NGOs.235
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Even before the FCTC, firms effectively used international
trademark law to undermine strong tobacco control measures. In 1992,
Australian legislators considered imposing a “plain packaging” regime on
cigarettes. 236 This requirement provided that only the manufacturer’s
name could appear in standardized black font, and that the remainder of
the package must remain an entirely uniform color, except for
government-mandated health warnings. 237 British American Tobacco
argued before the Australian Senate that the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property and Australian law would require
compensation for the value of its cigarette brands. 238 The Australian
government rejected the proposed regulations.239 The Ministry of Health
announced that “[u]nfortunately, [the proposal] is just not feasible . . . .
We would have to buy the tobacco companies’ trademarks, and that would
cost us hundreds of millions of dollars.” 240 Australia revived its plain
packaging plan in 2011 and the government prevailed in the High Court of
Australia in 2012. In 2011, PMI initiated arbitration proceedings (again
through a wholly owned entity) against Australia under a BIT in effect
between it and Hong Kong. 241 Ukraine quickly requested consultations
and the establishment of a dispute settlement panel under the auspices of
the WTO, attracting the attention of dozens of states interested in whether
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or not Australia’s plain packaging regime is consistent with TRIPS, the
TBT Agreement, and/or GATT.242
E.

Thailand and Pictorial Warnings on Alcoholic Beverage Containers

In January 2010, Thailand proposed legislation requiring that graphic
warning labels cover thirty percent of the surface of beer, wine, and spirits
containers. 243 The subsequent response by international alcoholic
beverages firms and their supporting governments foreshadows the
similarities likely between strong tobacco packaging and labeling
regulations and international intellectual property claims.
The US representative noted that Clause 3 of the draft regulation
precluded US labels from having: “any word or statement that
misleads consumers to understand that alcoholic beverages are safe
and good for health or contain lower level of harmful substances
compared with other alcoholic beverages or contains words or
statements that directly or indirectly advertise the alcoholic
beverage”. . . . . to the extent that a registered trademark contained
any such description, this vague provision could result in trademarks
being prohibited on alcoholic beverage packaging.244
Argentina, Australia, Chile, Mexico, the EU, New Zealand, and
Switzerland also raised either intellectual property or trade barrier
challenges to the proposed regulations. 245 In his analysis of alcohol
manufacturers’ participation in trade and investment treaties, Dr. Donald
Zeigler observes parallels between the tobacco companies’ intellectual
property claims and those that alcohol manufacturers advocate in trade and
investment instruments.246
IV.

INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH LAW IN A WORLD OF STRONG
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

It is certainly true that international intellectual property protections do
not completely preclude international public health law’s potential gains.
For example, IP protections pose no obvious barriers to preventing the
distribution of free infant formula samples to health care workers nor
242
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adopting prohibitions on smoking in public places. Moreover, there are
inchoate efforts in discrete areas of international public health law
generally unrelated to IP rights, like the international recruitment of health
workers. 247 Yet, broadly speaking, the potential gains from existing
international public health law instruments and those on the horizon are
fundamentally tied to the subordination of the wide powers intellectual
property holders now hold. In spite of the episodes described above, the
central significance of international intellectual property protection to the
development of international public health law appears curiously askew of
global health advocates’ primary agenda.
Article 15 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, for
example, calls for the elimination of all forms of illicit trade in tobacco
products, of which counterfeit cigarettes are an integral part. When the
parties negotiated a separate treaty to give effect to that provision, the
Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, they agreed in
Article 2 that “[n]othing in this Protocol shall affect the rights and
obligations of any Party pursuant to any other international convention,
treaty or international agreement in force for that Party that it deems to be
more conducive to the achievement of the elimination of illicit trade in
tobacco products.” 248 In short, any agreement which gives strong
protection to tobacco trademarks, which are always asserted as a defense
against the counterfeit cigarette trade, is fully compatible with the
Protocol.249
Similarly, at the same time the WHO is attempting to conclude a
Medical Research and Innovation Treaty, it is also undertaking greater
efforts toward fostering collaboration on counterfeit medicines and
devices, i.e., unsafe, unregulated, or fraudulently labeled or represented
drugs which pose risks of illness, injury or death to patients. There are of
course numerous ways to define “counterfeit” drugs including heavy
emphasis on protected trademarks under TRIPS250 or in connection with
their effects on patients, in which IP rights are less implicated. 251
Notwithstanding key policy flexibilities attached to definitional choices,
the World Health Assembly has decided to study the public health effects
of counterfeit medicines “excluding trade and intellectual property
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considerations” which will inevitably influence the outcome of any
international agreement on the issue.252
Those calling for a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control have
argued rather loosely that it should be another version of the FCTC, and
have advanced few if any provisions which might address the IP
challenges the FCTC has faced. The WHO’s Global Strategy to Reduce
the Harmful Use of Alcohol acknowledges the role of marketing in
influencing consumption but does not address the role of trademarks law
in obstructing recommended measures. The Framework Convention on
Global Health has gone somewhat further, suggesting that “an FCGH
could require states and international organizations to show that loan
conditions or trade rules are not detrimental to the public's health.”253 and
that “an FCGH could go further by . . . . protecting bilateral and regional
trade agreements from provisions that could reduce access to medicine”)
but still avoids the detailed international IP protections that would
jeopardize the FCGH’s mission. 254
A.

Rescission of Existing Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral Intellectual
Property Agreements

Whatever the promise of health diplomacy, it does not appear that
“health” is overcoming the traditional concerns of “diplomacy.” Unlikely
solutions call for the elimination of international IP agreements altogether.
Some, like Kojo Yelpalla would simply throw entire agreements like
TRIPS out:
It is now widely acknowledged by most observers that TRIPS is a
serious threat to human health security . . . .
Before TRIPS, over forty countries offered no patent protection for
pharmaceutical inventions. Such sovereign authority of states has
been compromised by TRIPS as part of the WTO system of
agreements . . . . This exploitation of the inequalities of bargaining
power was undertaken at a time when many developing countries were
ill equipped or unprepared to appreciate all the implications of TRIPS.
Nor did they fully understand the significance of the converging forces
at work. In riding the tidal wave of these forces, the developed
countries did not merely succeed in linking the right to trade to the
protection of intellectual property rights; they also succeeded in setting
up a structure whereby, under international law, foreign private
252
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interests could subvert the political authority and public interest of the
state.”255
Even scholars less hostile to the underlying purpose of the agreement
concede that the built-in flexibilities of TRIPS 256 may not help much
against determined IP-rights holders with the heaviest investments in
knowledge-intensive processes or assets.257 Yet it is certainly true that in
response to developments in international investment and trade law some
states are revising or withdrawing from agreements with strong
intellectual property protections.258
B.

Revision of Existing Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral Intellectual
Property Agreements

Other, more pragmatic, solutions require working within existing
international IP agreement frameworks.
Bilateral, regional and
international IP treaties, for example, do not need to afford IP holders an
entire administrative and judicial framework which may, and often does,
exaggerate the benefit those goods offer. Firms, for example, have shown
themselves able to punish governments who threaten their intellectual
property investments. 259 Other solutions involve explicit limitations on
the adjudicatory rights private parties enjoy under bilateral or multilateral
instruments.260 This is, in effect, the aim of the Doha Declaration which
emphasizes the rights of governments to facilitate access to medicines for
255
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their citizens as well as more modern trends in bilateral investment
treaties.261 The United States for example, has determined that investment
agreements should not provide foreign investors with greater substantive
protections than domestic investors.262 Australia has recently moved away
from investor-state dispute resolution in its investment agreements. 263
Other possibilities include concrete exceptions for public health measures
and the exemption of IP and related rights from bilateral agreements.
Another strategy is to explicitly address international intellectual
property rights in international public health agreements themselves.
WHO Article 19 treaties, like the FCTC and its Illicit Trade Protocol,
Article 21 measures like the IHR, and even Article 23 recommendations
like the International Code frankly depend on the curtailment or at least
contextualization of IP rights to succeed. Ignoring or downplaying the
importance of IP rights leaves large gaps in the potential coverage offered
by international public health law. To phrase it another way, international
public health law to a significant extent is intellectual property law. To be
sure, IP issues often permeate negotiations over international public health
law instruments. Negotiators successfully included “trademark” as a
subject of FCTC Article 11’s prohibition on misleading descriptors over
the objection of states with strong trademark-rights holding
constituencies.264 But the examples described above including the Illicit
Trade Protocol, the Framework Convention on Alcohol Control and the
Framework Convention on Global Health demonstrate the general
reluctance to specifically address management of IP rights as part of
broader international public health law initiatives.
This is unsustainable even for public-private partnerships which
generally operate well within the boundaries of international intellectual
property protection. The Global Fund’s activities, for example, may fall
afoul of ACTA. 265 The GAVI Alliance’s model of Advanced Market
Commitment institutionalizes the fundamental difficulty IP rights pose:
because the AMC’s are so expensive and technically detailed, they both
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limit the amount of vaccines which can be purchased and threaten to
crowd out lower-cost manufacturers.266
These strategies do not necessarily need to sharply limit or manage IP
rights in the text of agreements. However, they must at least address the
fundamental threat that enforceable IP rights in international agreements
pose to public health interventions. These threats, of course, vary in their
severity. For patents, for example, there is an identifiable point of
protection at which original innovation is encouraged and therefore
welfare-enhancing. Past that point, the patent monopoly threatens
accompanying innovations which may result in higher quality products or
processes or means by which those products or processes might be less
expensively distributed. For trademarks, especially alcohol, beverage,
food and tobacco trademarks, rights-holders spend vast amounts learning
which shapes, colors, figures and other visual cues will enhance
consumption well beyond any limit set by evidence-based nutrition policy
or even the limited purpose trademarks are meant to serve: distinguishing
competitors’ products or services.267
For example, it makes sense to impose upon tobacco manufacturers
liability with respect to the costs deceptive trademarks impose on society
and the heavy investments they make in shaping the perception of their
products’ risk. That liability may be imposed without violating trademark
protective terms in TRIPS and many bilateral investment treaties. This
was originally possible under early versions of Article 19 of the FCTC,
although it was eventually given limited scope. The same would be true,
to varying extents, for alcohol and food manufacturers. Together, these
three industries account for a significant part of the disease burden that
international public health law aims to address.
The Medical Research and Innovation Treaty, to date, represents the
approach most likely to harmonize international intellectual property law
and international public health law in ways respectful of both. The treaty
creates a regime under which specific drug and medical device
development will occur in a space “where the current [international
intellectual property] system does not function.” The compromises
involved will no doubt disappoint both strong IP-rights advocates and
public health advocates, but explicitly balancing the costs and benefits of
each in open forum increases the chance that an equitable conclusion will
be reached. Indeed, the treaty, once considered dead letter, was revived
during the 2013 meeting of the World Health Assembly when the United
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States proposed a series of demonstration projects that might bridge the
current, deep divides between member states over the treaty’s terms.268
C.

The Role of Multipolarity in Rebalancing International Intellectual
Property Protections and International Public Health Law

Addressing intellectual property challenges in public health treaties
inevitably means protracted negotiations and perhaps fewer agreements.
On the one hand, this might mean resources are allocated to more effective
uses. If the allocation of scarce resources requires a choice, advocates for
better access to medicines may do better influencing the scope of
patentability in statutory regimes than in negotiating a medical research
and innovation treaty.269 On the other hand, the shifting distribution of
global political power also increases the opportunities for compromises
that may not have existed in 2004 (IHR) or 2005 (FCTC) and certainly did
not exist in 1981 (International Code). For example, Brazil and India,
which operated largely outside the international trading system in 1981,
are now among its most important participants.270 Their thriving generics
industries have encouraged both states to use international intellectual
property treaties to loosen the strong protections given patents and
trademarks in the medicines context.
Similarly, efforts like a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control
face long odds given that the world’s largest alcoholic beverage firms
have steep roots not only in North America and Europe but also in
Australia, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. Paula O’Brien has pointed
out the inconsistency between Australia’s aggressive treatment of tobacco
trademarks and the protests it has launched against Thailand’s efforts to
268
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use the same public health intervention for alcohol disease burden it
bears.271
It is not only individual states and their relative influence that will bear
on the potential success of international public health law in the future.272
Brazil, India and South Africa also build coalitions and alliances through
direct monetary and non-monetary aid.273 The growing web of economic
and political alliances between these and other developing states will
expand the possibilities for coalition building in support of certain
international instruments but against others. 274
V.

CONCLUSION

Confrontations between expanding intellectual property rights and
international public health law are now poised to increase rather than abate
as international agreements addressing both proliferate. 275 If the
population health gains envisioned by the International Code, the IHR and
the FCTC, as well as a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control or a
Framework Convention on Global Health are to materialize, their
respective advocates must more squarely address the obstacles
international property agreements pose for those gains and develop
strategies to overcome them or concede their political improbability.
These strategies include negotiating concrete public health safe harbors in
bilateral investment and trade agreements, modifying dispute resolution
mechanisms and conditioning compliance with national law and norms.276
Other possibilities include ex post strategies which redistribute monopoly
gains intellectual property rights holders enjoy. For example, Article 19
of the FCTC might authorize compensation for illness or injury caused by
consumption induced by a misleading trademark. 277 The proposed
medical research and innovation treaty, for example, places at its core
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redistributive defects inherent in strong intellectual property regimes.
Despite opposition from states with strong patent right holding
constituencies, the proposal is, slowly, moving forward. As or more
important, the changing distribution of economic, diplomatic and political
power renders a broader range of possibilities for coalition building and
influence, especially where Brazil, India and South Africa are key
stakeholders.278
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